How did the San Francisco Peace Treaty Influence Elementary School English-language Education in Okinawa? by 与那覇 恵子
61
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES
Volume 40 (2018): 61-82
 How did the San Francisco Peace Treaty Influence 
Elementary School English-language Education in 
Okinawa? 
 YONAHA Keiko ＊ 
Introduction
 　 Compulsory English education was introduced into elementary schools in 
Okinawa just after the battle of Okinawa ended in 1945.  However, this ended in 
1953 with a short history of just eight years.  This paper examines how U.S. 
policy toward Okinawa influenced education policy in Okinawa and how this 
education policy was reflected in compulsory English-language education in 
elementary schools.  In particular, this research focuses on how the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty influenced English-language education in Okinawan elementary 
schools.  Evidence shows that the San Francisco Peace Treaty clarified the 
political position of Okinawa, and this position was the reason for the end of 
compulsory English-language education in elementary schools.  Several well-
known books have addressed the U.S. policy toward Okinawa:1 for example, 
Miyazato Seigen discusses how U.S. policies toward Japan and Okinawa were set 
up and how Okinawa was separated from Japan; Ota Masahide describes the 
occupation policy under the governance of successive high commissioners; 
Robert. D. Eldridge traces the roots of the Okinawan issue by focusing on the 
relationship between Japan and the U.S.; and Hara Kimie points out how the 
treaty left territorial issues as the seeds of future disputes by studying Article 3 in 
the peace treaty.  Arnold G. Fisch Jr.’s research on the early U.S. occupation of 
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 1.  Miyazato Seigen, America no Taigai Seisaku Katei (San-Ichi Shobo Publishing Inc., 
1981); Ota Masahide, Okinawa no Teio, Koto Benmukan (Asahi Shimbunsha, 1984); Robert. D. 
Eldridge, Okinawa Mondai no Kigen: Sengo Nichibei Kankei ni okeru Okinawa 1945–1952 
(Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2003); Hara Kimie, San Francisco Heiwa Jōyaku no Moten 
(Keisui-sha, 2011). 
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Okinawa is well known.2 Nicholas Evan Sarantakes also examined the American 
administration of Okinawa and the problems it posed for relations between Japan 
and the U.S.3  These scholars focus on U.S. policies toward Japan and Okinawa, 
or the relationship between the U.S. and Japan or Okinawa; their scope is limited 
to the political and social fields, and their research does not extend to the 
educational field.  As for education in U.S.-occupied Okinawa, several previous 
studies, including Gordon Warner, Yamauchi Susumu, Ishihara Shoei, and Uehara 
Yoshinori have looked at education in Okinawa under the U.S. military 
occupation.4 Warner provides a general outline of education in Okinawa during 
that period, but does not focus particularly on English-language education, while 
Ishihara examines U.S. language policy and the response of the Okinawan people. 
A study by Uehara concentrates on the curricula in senior high schools.  Even 
though Yamauchi outlines the entire history of English-language education in 
Okinawa, the discussion of compulsory education is not a detailed one.  Thus, no 
studies specifically consider why compulsory English-language education in 
elementary schools was curtailed.  This paper studies the influence of U.S. 
policies toward Okinawa in the field of education in Okinawa with a focus on the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty as a summary of U.S. policies toward Okinawa.
　 Regarding the U.S. governance of Okinawa, the Department of the Army had 
two responsible parties in Washington: the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army for 
civil service and the Deputy Chief of Affairs and Military Government for military 
service.  I use the terms “the Ryukyus” and “Okinawa” interchangeably in this 
paper.  Geographically, “Ryukyu” usually refers to all the islands―the main island 
of Okinawa, plus Miyako, and Yaeyama, including other small islets around these 
islands.  “Okinawa” usually refers to the main island of Okinawa; however, it is 
also used in place of “the Ryukyus.” “Ryukyu” was used as the name of all the 
islands including mainland Okinawa before haihan chiken5 in the Meiji era, and 
“Ryukyu han” then became “Okinawa Prefecture.” Thus, the name “Ryukyu” was 
 2.  Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945―1950 (United 
States Government Printing, 1988).
 3.  Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-
Japanese Relations (Texas A & M University Press, 2000). 
 4.  Gordon Warner, History of Education in Postwar Okinawa (Nihon bunka kagaku-sha 
Co. Ltd, 1972); Yamauchi Susumu, “Sengo Okinawa ni okeru Amerika no Gengo-seisaku,” 
302–305 in Sengo Okinawa to Amerika: Ibunka Sesshoku no 50 nen (Okinawa Taimusu-sha, 
1996); Ishihara Shoei, “Sengo Okinawa ni okeru Beikoku no Gengo Seisaku to Okinawa no 
Hanno,” in America Toochi to Sengo Okinawa (Heisei 10・11・12 nendo Kagaku Kenkyuhi 
Hojyokin, Kenkyu Seika Hokokusyo, 2001); and Uehara Yoshinori, Okinawa no Eigo 
Kyoikushi Kenkyu-Meiji-ki kara Sengo-fukki made no Futu-chutogakko no Eigo Kyoiku katei 
no Hensen o Chushin ni. PhD diss., Hiroshima University, 2008. 
 5.  Haihan chiken refers to the abolition of the han system and its replacement with 
prefectures. 
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changed to “Okinawa” at this time.  However, “Ryukyu” was favorably used in 
place of “Okinawa” during the U.S. occupation by the U.S. military government 
and the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR).  Therefore, 
in this paper both “Ryukyu” and “Okinawa” are used and both refer to the islands 
of the Ryukyus, including the main island of Okinawa.
I:  U.S. Policy toward Okinawa
　 In April 1943, the Ryukyu Islands were not regarded as strategically important 
for the U.S. This was the case when an adequate base was developed on Formosa.6 
Ryukyu may not have become a U.S. military base in Asia if U.S. troops had 
landed on Formosa; however, the U.S. Army landed on Okinawa to fight the 
Japanese Army on March 26, 1945.  Organized battles against the Japanese Army 
ended June 23, 1945, with Commander Ushijima Mitsuru’s suicide, and on July 2, 
1945, the U.S. military declared the end of the battle of Okinawa.7  At the time, 
there was no decisive U.S. policy as to the future disposition of the Ryukyu 
Islands.  The Department of State, the War Department, and the Navy Department 
had made no joint recommendation in regard to the matter.8
　 In October 1945, the “Overall Examination of U.S. requirements for Military 
Base and Rights” was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) resolution 
570/40, and Ryukyu came to be regarded as an important military base.9  Since 
this was before the establishment of the Cold War regime, Eldridge rejects the 
idea that the Okinawan issue was a product of the Cold War regime, which started 
to appear in 1948.10  If we accept his view, it can be understood that the Cold War 
regime was used as an excuse for the idea in JCS570/40 that the U.S. should gain 
strategic control over the region.  The initial policy toward Okinawa as of June 
 6. 059―00673―00011―002, I―7: Riuchius, Code No. 0000105471, Series No. 0000003795, 
RG 59 Records of the Office of Assistant Secretary and Under Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, 1941–48, 50, NARA (NND 957300).  The view was expressed by a member of the 
Security Subcommittee that the Riuchiu (Ryukyu) islands will be of no great importance 
strategically to the United States or the United Nations if an adequate base is developed at 
some point on Formosa.  Several members emphasized the importance of disarming Japan 
rather than separating outlying island areas from Japanese rule (August 21, 1942). 
 7.  Okinawa: Nichibei Saigo no Sento, The United States Department of the Army (editor), 
Hokama Seishiro (translator) (Kojinsha, NFbunko, 1997, 518).
 8.  OPA, 0000073428, NARA, The Berlin Conference, Territorial Studies.  Prepared by the 
Department of State for the Meeting of the Heads of Government, page 8. 
 9. JCS 570/40, “Over-All Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Bases and 
Fights” October 25, 1945, Box 272, section 9, file CCS 360 (12―9―42), Central Decimal Files, 
1942–1945, RG 218. 
 10.  Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in 
Postwar U.S. Japan Relations, 1945–1952 (New York: Garland, 2001). 
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1946 was that “the Ryukyu Islands should be regarded as minor islands to be 
retained by Japan and demilitarized” by admitting their close relation with Japan. 
The U.S. establishment of a permanent base in Okinawa or elsewhere in the 
Ryukyu Islands would have likely provoked serious international repercussions 
and would, therefore, have been politically objectionable.11  On September 27, 
1946, JCS1619/8 was forwarded to the Statistical & Reports Sections with the 
subject “Disposition of Ryukyu Islands.” JCS1619/6 expressed the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff’s grave concerns about the State Department’s proposals for returning 
Ryukyu to Japanese control.  JCS1619/8 described the threat of the USSR12 and it 
designated Okinawa as the only base area from which U.S. forces could be 
projected into that area since Okinawa covered the area of the Pacific between the 
Aleutians and the Philippines and west of the Marianas.  It also noted that control 
of Okinawa as a key base in Asia would make the U.S. available to dominate the 
northwestern Pacific and the lines of communication to China as well as make it a 
major element in the defense of the Philippines.  The disagreement between the 
JCS and the State Department continued.  In this situation, it can be said that the 
policy toward Okinawa was not yet decided even in 1947.  Although the postwar 
economy was in rehabilitation, a long-range program was difficult to plan in view 
of the undetermined future international status of the islands.
　 In a letter from President Harry S. Truman to George Atcheson Jr.  (United 
States Political Adviser for Japan), dated July 10, 1947, the president 
acknowledged a letter dated June 19 which included a request from Japan’s new 
foreign minister, Ashida, for the return of the Southern Kuriles and Okinawa, and 
Atcheson’s recommendation to maintain U.S. control of Okinawa as a keystone 
for Western Pacific air force defense.13  The policy planning staff (PPS) of the 
State Department wrote of the Ryukyus in a forty-page draft that the minimum 
objectives were “The neutralization of Japan through the maintenance of powerful 
U.S. bases in the Ryukyus, Bonins (Ogasawara), Volcano Islands (Io retto), and 
Marcus (Minami Tori shima).” Though it was said U.S. military bases in the 
Ryukyus would be necessary for the neutralization of Japan,14 this idea was still 
fluid due to the problem of the governing ability of the U.S. Regarding the 
strategic trusteeship over the Ryukyus, the State Department consistently 
 11.  Papers of Harry S. Truman President’s Secretary’s Files, 001 Harry S. Truman Library, 
Box 119, SWNCC59/1, June 24, 1946. 
 12.  U900379B, JCS 1619/8, Disposition of Ryukyu Islands.  Okinawa Prefectural Archive 
(OPA). 
 13. Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, University Publications of America, 
OPA, 0000073433, an imprint of CIS, Document 33.
 14.  Memorandum for the Under Secretary of the Army, October 20, 1947.  U.S. policy 
Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan issued from P&O (NND770012, 00012―002, National 
Archives and Records Administration [NARA], Memorandums to JCS and Others, 1947–49, 
OPA, 0000098435). 
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disagreed with the Service Department.  Upon request of the JCS, the Secretaries 
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force dispatched a joint letter to the Secretary of State 
endorsing the JCS position.  The letter commented on the emperor’s message as 
follows: 
He (the Japanese emperor) recommends that the U.S. obtain such base rights as may 
be necessary in the Ryukyus through a long-term lease arrangement with Japan to be 
provided for by a separate bilateral treaty with Japan after the peace settlement.15
　 PPS10/1 recommended the emperor’s message that suggested a long-term lease 
of the Ryukyus as an idea to solve the conflict between the JCS and the State 
Department, which was not able to satisfy the JCS.  On August 5, 1948, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued a report on the significance of the 
Ryukyu Islands, and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, 
Army, Navy, and the Air Force concurred in the report.  According to the report, 
the Ryukyu Islands, especially Okinawa, would give (a) an advantage in either 
defensive or offensive operations in Asia; (b) a watch post to guard the sea 
approaches to Central and North China and Korea; and (c) a base for air 
surveillance over a wide area.  Therefore, U.S. control of the Ryukyu Islands 
would (a) give the U.S. a position from which to operate in defense of an unarmed 
post-treaty Japan and U.S. bases in the Philippines and other Pacific Islands; (b) 
obviate the possibility of the Ryukyus falling under the control of a potential 
enemy; (c) neutralize, to some extent, Soviet positions in the Kurils, Korea, and 
Manchuria; and (d) give the USA a position from which to discourage any revival 
of military aggression on the part of the Japanese.  The CIA believed the Ryukyus 
would be significant for the U.S. to defend against its potential enemy, the Soviets 
(and including the threat of a revival of Japan).16  This is proof that the CIA was 
involved in the foreign policy-making process.
　 As of October 7, 1948, the agenda of the Ryukyus remained pending in 
NSC13/2 and the possibility of using Okinawa as a naval base was mentioned 
based on the assumption that the U.S. military would remain in control there on a 
long-term basis.  Around the same time in 1948, the Department of the Army 
enlisted the Ryukyus among the foreign bases necessary to meet the requirements 
of the emergency war plan.  The Ryukyus were placed tenth on the list with the 
categorization “occupational only,” and the Army and Air Force were allowed 
expenditure of funds.17  In January 1949, the mission of the U.S. military 
 15.  NARA, NND 959297, OPA, 059―01586―00049―001. 
 16.  NARA, NND 755001, RG319, OPA, 0000003837, RG319. 
 17.  Basic Policies and Objectives of the United States in the Pacific and Far East as of 
May, 1949 RG335, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army. 0000106865, 211J, 
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 40 / 201866
government was “to have Okinawa separate from Japan economically, socially, 
and politically as well as managing U.S. military rule over the Ryukyus until the 
political position of Ryukyu [would be] decided.”18  These steps led to the period 
during which Okinawan educators were barred from using teaching materials that 
related to Japan.  This idea was the background in which “Ryukyu” was favorably 
used in place of “Okinawa” during the U.S. occupation by the U.S. military 
government and the USCAR.  It was NSC13/3 (May 6, 1949) where the U.S. 
decided on the long-term possession of the Ryukyus.
　 In the fall of 1949, more than $50 million for building U.S. military bases was 
included in the budget for the fiscal year 1950.  At the time, Major General J. R. 
Sheetz, who was the U.S. Military Chief in the Ryukyus, ran an effective 
administration that was evaluated well by Okinawan people, and this government 
started building the bases in Okinawa with U.S. fiscal support.  Even though 
Sheetz personally was popular and his governance well evaluated, the finances 
acquired to build the bases may have worked advantageously for his governance. 
After a short period of governing by Sheetz, land confiscation by the U.S. military 
base began in full swing in 1950, with the Okinawan people resisting.  For the 
U.S., geological and economic factors, such as Okinawa’s dependence on external 
assistance, made Okinawa a convenient site for a major air base in the Far East.19 
In connection with NSC13/3, the United States Navy shaped its policy in the 
development of the Yokosuka base.  Meanwhile, it proceeded to develop the 
possibility of Okinawa as a naval base on the assumption that American forces 
would remain in control there on a long-term basis.20  
　 In June 1949, the Navy Department, which had examined the possibility of 
Okinawa for development as a naval base, determined that it was not suitable as a 
year-around naval base because of unfavorable meteorological and hydrographic 
features.21  The Ryukyus was evaluated as “very valuable to the U.S. as a major 
air base in the Far East.” The U.S. policy toward Okinawa was “at a politically 
expedient time to press for a U.S. trusteeship under the UN; meanwhile to foster 
and materially assist the expeditious development of native education, industries, 
0000003853, NARA, NND780012 (SWNCC No.54: Basic Policies and Objectives of the U.S. 
in the Pacific and Far East). 
 18.  NARA, UND780072, OPA, 335―00024―00002―004.
 19.  OPA, 335―00024―00001―003.  The memorandum of May 1949 (335―00024―00001―
003) describes the situation of Ryukyu as “completely dependent economically on external 
assistance; lacking in politically and technologically trained native leaders; possesses few 
important natural resources and almost no industrial potential; very valuable to U.S. as a major 
air base in the Far East.” 
 20.  Report by the National Security Council on Recommendation with respect to United 
States policy toward Japan.  OPA, 0000099597, Office Diary for SCAP, 1942―1949. 
 21.  NARA, NND943011, OPA, 211Ba052, Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 
8, 1949. 
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and improved living conditions.”22   The general policy toward Okinawa during 
this time can be read as one to develop and maintain the facilities on a long-term 
basis by reason of the importance of the islands to the interests of the U.S.23  
　 In all the above, Okinawa was viewed from a military viewpoint; however, the 
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 59/1 designated the Ryukyus 
as an area not to be detached from Japan and an area not to be placed under a 
trusteeship.  The rational offer noted that the islands had been closely associated 
with Japan for many centuries and that their population was culturally and racially 
Japanese.  The document concluded that for the U.S. to take over any part of the 
Ryukyu Islands would be contrary to its policy of opposing territorial expansion 
whether for itself or for other countries.  It also expressed concern that from a 
practical point of view, control of the Ryukyus would require a considerable 
financial outlay by the U.S. for the support and development of governing three-
quarters of a million people with a totally alien culture and outlook.  Further, it 
raised the concern that the establishment of a permanent base in the Ryukyus 
might provoke serious international repercussions from other global leaders, 
including China and the Soviet Union.24  There were two ideas: one that put 
Okinawa under an exclusive strategic rule as a crucial military base in Asia by 
separating it from Japan, and another that kept Okinawa out of the trusteeship by 
not separating it from Japan.  Although the confrontation between the State 
Department and the military continued from 1946, the political position of 
Okinawa was not clarified, largely due to the lack of a policy toward the USSR. 
Officially, the political position of Okinawa was finalized by the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty.
　 It was in NSC 13/2 (February 1, 1949) that America’s long-term possession of 
Okinawa was approved by President Truman.  The approval of NSC 13/3 (May 6, 
1949) decided that the Ryukyu Islands south of 29°N would be possessed long-
term by the U.S.25  
　 In the Office Memorandum of the U.S. Government as of April 27, 1950, 
which was prepared in connection with the “Reappraisal of U.S. Foreign 
Economic Policies and Program,” the following summary was provided to John 
Foster Dulles, consultant to the secretary in charge of the treaty project, and, in 
context it can be read as U.S. policy.
 22.  SWNCC No.54:  Basic Policies and Objectives of the U.S. in the Pacific and Far East 
(OPA, 0000106870, NND780012, NARA). 
 23. Collection of Messages 1945–1951, OPA, 0000099641, Blue Binder Series, August 
1945–June 1950, RG9, Message from DA (SAOUS OUSFE) dated December 9, 1949. 
 24.  OPA, 0000073423, 00119―001, Trusteeship.  Pacific Islands, Harry S. Truman Library, 
President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 119, SWNCC 59/1.
 25.  RG59, Office of Northeast Asia Affairs, Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with 
Japan, Subject File, 1945–51, Box 6. 
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The United States intends to retain on a long-term basis the facilities as are deemed 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be necessary in the Ryukyu Islands south of 29°N, 
Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan.  The military bases at or 
near Okinawa should be developed accordingly.26  
The notice clearly shows that the idea of holding the Ryukyu Islands for a U.S. 
military base on a long-term basis was insisted by the JCS.
　 Finally, the political stance of the Ryukyus was decided by Article 3 in the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty signed on September 8, 1951.  It was decided that the 
Ryukyus would be put under the trusteeship of the U.S. as a single administrative 
power and the U.S. would possess part or all the authority of administration, 
legislation, and judicature against the residents and territories, including the 
territorial waters.27  Okinawa was not a trust territory that the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines as “a non-self-governing territory placed under an 
administrative authority by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations,” but 
rather a trust territory that the Collins English Dictionary defines as “a territory 
placed under the administrative authority of a country by the United Nations.” 
Twenty-one years of U.S. military occupation was a long and challenging time for 
Okinawa under extraterritoriality, but the door to reversion to Japan was opened 
because Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyus was approved.
II:  Education Policy in Okinawa
2―1.  Before the San Francisco Peace Treaty
　 Based on early U.S. policies toward Okinawa, and from the viewpoint of 
reviewing militaristic education, organized group activities were prohibited in 
Okinawan education.  Nakamura Toshimasa, a teacher at the time, said that when 
he engaged students in group activities, U.S. military jeeps would enter the 
schoolyard and U.S. soldiers would accuse the instructors of introducing 
militaristic education.  He said these things often happened since his school faced 
the road.28  
　 At the same time, the policy separating Okinawa from Japan was enacted.  This 
policy was issued by General Headquarters (GHQ), the Supreme Commander for 
 26. NARA, NND 867207 OPA, 059―01228―00001―006.
 27. No. 1832, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, etc.  Treaty of Peace with 
Japan (with two declarations).  Signed at San Francisco, 8 September, 1951.  https://treaties.
un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20136/volume-136-i-1832-english.pdf. 
 28. A Centennial Commemorative Publication of Agarie Elementary School (Nago, Agarie 
elementary school, 1983).
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the Allied Powers, on January 29, 1946.29  Based on this U.S. policy, it was 
considered that separating Okinawa from Japan should also include the field of 
education.  Bunkyō no. 1892, issued by Okinawa Bunkyōbuchō Yamashiro Atuo 
on November, 7, 1946, listed the songs “I’m a soldier” and “Play soldiers” as 
examples of “Militaristic songs and Japanese songs which should be prohibited” 
at elementary schools and kindergartens.30  As the Text Compilation Staff General 
Editor, Nakasone Seizen comments that the editing policies were to exclude (1) 
militaristic materials, (2) ultra-nationalistic materials, and (3) typically Japanese 
materials.31  
　 From the viewpoint of U.S. rule over Okinawa, English-language education as 
a compulsory subject began in 1945.  The first textbook editorial policy issued in 
1946 stated the objective of education as learning about the situation of East Asia 
and the world, especially deepening the understanding of the influence of the U.S. 
In keeping with the goal of maximizing U.S. interests, English-language education 
was emphasized as follows: 
1  hour per week from 1st to 4th grade
2  hours per week for 5th and 6th grade
3  hours per week for 7th and 8th grade32  
　 As of January 1949, the U.S. policy was to have the Ryukyus separate from 
Japan.33  The increasing emphasis on English-centered education̶and 
particularly language proficiency̶throughout Japanese students’ schooling 
shows how intensely the governing U.S. bodies regarded the educational 
separation of Okinawa from mainland Japan.
　 From 1945 to 1950, the three branches of the U.S. military agreed on the 
militaristic value of Okinawa; however, in Washington, there was no direct answer 
for the future of Okinawa.  As a result, Okinawa was in a situation in which it had 
to deal with orders made on the spot from GHQ in Tokyo.  With a lack of 
budgetary ability and an undetermined long-term view, Okinawa became a 
forgotten island on which military discipline worsened, crimes and accidents 
 29.  Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan, 
issued by GHQ, document as of January 29, 1946, SCAPIN―677.
 30. Okinawa no Sengo Kyoikushi Shiryo (Okinawa Kyoiku Iinkai, 1978), 393.
 31.  Arasaki Moriteru, Okinawa Gendai-shi e no Shogen (Okinawa Taimusu-sha, 1982), 
184.
 32. Okinawa no Sengo Kyoikushi (Okinawa-ken Kyoiku Iinkai, 1977).  In report 53, issued 
by Bunkyōbu on April 5, 1946.
 33.  The Mission of the U.S. Military Government UND780072NARA (335―00024―00002―
004) as of January 1949.
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committed by U.S. soldiers became commonalities,34 and the people who lost 
everything in the war eked out a living on the rationed goods of the military.  In 
this disheartening situation, the education program was pursued with realism and 
a satisfactory degree of success considering the drastic shortage of buildings, 
equipment, teachers, and transportation facilities.35  
　 What changed the situation were the victories of the Communist Party in China 
and the threat of Russia from 1949 to 1950.  After the Korean War began in June 
1950, a budget for base-building began to be provided to Okinawa.  Until its 
military value came into focus, Okinawa was almost abandoned when compared 
to Japan in which GHQ was immediately stationed after the war.  The document 
titled “Ryukyu no Kyoiku” (Education in Okinawa) shows that the U.S. 
contribution to education was also lacking in Okinawa compared to mainland 
Japan.  A U.S. delegation visited the Japanese mainland twice, in March 1946 and 
September 1959, to promote educational reform.  GHQ organized the groups by 
representatives of education-related organizations in Japan and held meetings with 
administrative officials, principals, and teachers to implement the policy 
recommended by the mission.  In addition to such full-time personnel, specialists 
from various fields attended conferences and workshops, ranging in time from a 
week to nine months.  The result was a conference attended by more than four 
thousand principals and teachers about how to spread educational reform and the 
new democratically-based educational principles.36  
　 However, in Okinawa, even though the same educational reform was 
introduced, there were no U.S. educators to help Okinawan educators understand 
the new educational principles.  The article describes the situation as follows: 　 
In the Ryukyus, on the other hand, while the structure of Japanese educational 
reform was accepted as a guide, there has never been a comparable staff of educators 
to work with the Ryukyuans to give them an understanding of the philosophy behind 
the proposed changes, and to help them draft the necessary laws, regulations, and 
standards to implement the changes.37  
　 The U.S. staff in charge of education were so busy procuring school materials 
in Okinawa, where everything had been destroyed by the ground war, and they 
rarely had time to deal with the content of education.  Advisors from GHQ or 
SCAP advisors visited Okinawa to give advice on education; however, it was 
impossible to secure the staff to work on the island permanently following the 
initial presentation.  As a result, even six years after the war (1951), reform had 
 34.  Frank Gibney “Okinawa: Forgotten Island.” Time, (November 28, 1949): 24, 27.
 35. Fisch, Military Government, 89.
 36. Ibid., 2, lines 4―16.
 37.  NND957387 (319―00061―00001―011), “Ryukyu no Kyoiku.”
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been made only at a policy level and was not realized in education.  While 
educational reform progressed remarkably in mainland Japan, it did not progress 
at all in Okinawa.
　 In response to the administrative discrepancy, the Kyoiku Sasshin Iinkai 
(Educational Reform Committee)38 was appointed to draft the Fundamental Law 
of Education.  Okinawan educators who were irritated with the slow recovery in 
education began to want to model educational practices after Japanese ones, not 
only in the educational system but also in the educational administration.39  In the 
first meeting on November 11, 1950, of the principals in Okinawa under the 
auspices of the Bunkyōbu, the Okinawa gunto government̶four groups of 
islands were local government entitities: Amami gunto, Okinawa gunto, Miyako 
gunto, and Yaeyama gunto̶resolved to make a plea to unify the Ryukyuan 
educational administration with that of mainland Japan.  Specifically, the 
resolution sought to put Okinawa under the administration of the Ministry of 
Education of Japan.  The appeal was made not only to the Japanese government 
but also to the U.S. government.  A request from Okinawan people living in 
mainland Japan was also submitted to General MacArthur.40  In opposition, the 
U.S. government replied that it would be impossible to put the Okinawan 
Bunkyōbu directly under the administration of the Ministry of Education of Japan, 
so the discussion concluded without result.
　 Therefore, it can be said that before the San Francisco Peace Treaty, U.S. 
policy toward Okinawa was to separate it from Japan and maintain it as a 
strategically important U.S. military base in Asia.  Accordingly, the U.S. 
government did not want the educational system in Okinawa to be under the 
administration of the Japanese Ministry of Education as found above in the reply 
of the U.S. government in Okinawa.  This position did change, however, with the 
ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
2―2.  After the San Francisco Peace Treaty
　 The San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in September 1951.  With its 
conclusion, the political position of Okinawa was decided.  On September 15, 
1951, the Okinawa Times ran an editorial titled “Education under the trusteeship,” 
and concerning education, it stated as follows: 
 38.  This was set up in August 1946 under the prime minister’s jurisdiction.  Its predecessor 
was an educational organization set up to cooperate with the United States Education Mission 
to Japan (author’s translation taken from the Britannica Daihyaka Jiten).
 39. Okinawa no Sengo Kyoikushi, 103.
 40.  “Letters from Japanese,” in Correspondence from Japanese 1945―1951, (0000099645) 
00173―007, RG10: B173, F7.
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The level of consistency that can be secured with Japan is concerned with several 
points: the period of the trusteeship, basic administration policy, education, economy, 
and transportation.  And through these issues, expressing people’s hope will be a 
good opportunity to make this situation positive.  Conversely, if we just pass the 
time without any hope, we will regret it forever and our descendants will blame us.  
If our nationality remains Japanese, it is natural to remain consistent with Japan in 
education, and we should steadfastly maintain knowledge of history, geography, 
policy, economics, and the culture of Japan so that we will not be at a loss when the 
reversion to Japan is realized.  We will never allow ourselves to be called “The 
Wandering Ryukyus.”41 (translation by author)
   The patriotic opinion expressed in this editorial was shared by Okinawan 
educators.  Yara Chobyo, the head of Bunkyōbu under the Okinawa gunto 
government, became the head of the Okinawa Association of Teachers in May 
1952, and he stressed the importance of shutaisei (independence) from the U.S.  It 
was the Association of Teachers led by Yara that guided the movement of 
Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.  Anticipating the day of reunification with Japan, 
Okinawan educators made efforts to have children learn Japanese in preference to 
English.  Okinawan educators did not stop preparing for the day of return to Japan 
even though they had several years of struggle under the U.S. occupation.
　 The fourth Bunkyō Shingi Iinkai (Bunkyō meeting) was held on September 18, 
1951, and the first item discussed was “trusteeship and Okinawa’s education.” 
Regarding Okinawa, the following requests were presented.
1.   Follow Japan in its educational system, administration, and content, and employ 
Japanese educational law.
2.   Follow Japan in teacher training and teaching certification and make it possible to 
exchange teachers as was done in the prewar period.
3.   Treat students as Japanese when they go to upper schools in Japan and have them 
stay or find employment in Japan after their graduation.
4.   As for the educational or cultural projects of the Ministry of Education, treat 
Ryukyu as a prefecture and have teachers attend the projects as well as obtain 
educational research materials distributed by the Ministry of Education.42  
The above is the same content that was resolved in the principals’ meeting held in 
1950.  This appeal was made from Okinawa to the Japanese government and from 
the Japanese government to the U.S. government.  The important objectives were 
 41. “Education under the trusteeship,” Okinawa Times’s editorial, Okinawa Times Shu 
1951, September 15, 1951.
 42. Okinawa no Sengo Kyoikushi, 1977, 56.
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(1) the construction of school buildings, and (2) making every day educational 
activities more independent and more fruitful by legislating educational 
regulations to provide legal grounds for educational activities.  We can see jishusei 
(autonomy) in the second objective, on which Yara placed the most importance.  It 
was difficult to “make every day educational activities more independent” under 
the occupation, but Okinawan educators considered this a key objective.
　 On April 1, 1952, the Ryukyu government was officially established and a 
ceremony was held at the University of the Ryukyus.  At the time, Governor 
Ridgeway stated that the U.S. would leave reunification matters between Japan 
and the Ryukyus to residents in the future.  Civil Administrator James. M. Lewis 
also stated his opinion that the self-governance of the Ryukyus should be attained 
by the public election of a Ryukyuan governor.43  On April 1, 1952, Governor 
Ridgeway stated in his message to residents in the opening ceremony of the 
Rippoin (the legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands) that the 
legislature was authorized to make laws necessary for executing the powers of the 
Provisional Central Government as set forth under Article III of Civil 
Administration Proclamation No. 3, “Establishment of Provisional Central 
Government” (April 1951).  According to the article of the Peace Treaty, the 
Ryukyu Islands shall be: 
[C]ontinuously politically separated from Japan for the time being.  However, 
political separation does not mean cutting off traditional cultural or economic ties.  
On the contrary, it is the U.S. civil government’s policy to put restrictions on only 
the necessities of military security and remove all unnecessary restrictions between 
the Ryukyus and Japan on travel, communication, business, etc.44 (translation by 
author)
　 Governor Ridgeway stated that except for the military, matters between the 
Ryukyus and Japan should be left to the residents, and that residents would be 
restricted only on the necessities of military security.  Since education was not a 
matter of military security, it was understood that the U.S. civil government’s 
attitude was to leave the matter of education to the Ryukyus.  In response to the 
message of the governor, in the 4th Resolution of Rippoin on April 29, a letter of 
appreciation was submitted.  It said upon receiving the message that unnecessary 
restrictions between the Ryukyus and Japan should be removed, and that they 
were very delighted and considered it as a step toward the Ryukyu’s complete 
reversion to Japan.  Governor Ridgeway’s message meant that the value of the 
Ryukyus was only in their connection to U.S. military objectives, and all the 
 43. Ibid., 105.
 44. Ryukyu Shiryo Dai Ni Shu, Seijihen 2 (Ryukyu Bunkyō-kyoku, 1978), 114.
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priorities should be placed on them.
   A memorandum from the Deputy Governor to the Deputy Civil Administrator 
(April 26, 1952) summarizes the following news article regarding the Japanese 
policy toward reversion: 
d.   Since Japan recognizes the right of the United States to retain military bases in 
Japan under administrative agreement reached pursuant to terms in the Security 
Pact, it is unreasonable to argue that a segment of recognized Japanese territory 
be detached from Japanese Civil jurisdiction for strategic reasons.  (No. 1, part d)
No. 2, which mentions the difficulty of Okinawa’s immediate return to Japan and 
gradual reversion, would entail the following: 
a.   Restrictions over intercourse between the Ryukyus and Japan should be modified.  
There should be free travel, remittance of money, and flow of students and goods.
b.   All economics, educational, and cultural administrative agencies should be made 
to conform with the Japanese pattern.  Another report favored having these 
matters placed under Japanese jurisdiction, with the exception of military 
affairs.45
It is clear that the U.S. government wanted to maintain U.S. military bases and 
U.S. control over military affairs in Okinawa and Japan.  The memorandum also 
clearly states negotiation efforts by the Japanese government so that all economic, 
educational, and cultural administrative agencies could be made to conform with 
the Japanese pattern and placed under Japanese jurisdiction.
   After the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the decision of the 
political position of Okinawa, Okinawa was allowed once again to conform with 
the Japanese pattern for education, which had been strongly requested by 
Okinawan educators.  The following section discusses how the change in policy 
affected compulsory elementary school English education.
III:   The Transition of Compulsory Elementary School English-Language 
Education
　 Shimoji (2001)46 reports that the U.S. government focused its efforts especially 
 45.  Memorandum for Deputy Civil Administrator, April 26, 1952, OPA, T00019769B, 
Ryukyu Shinpo, March (00000253, 00000254), United States Civil Administration of the 
Ryukyus Islands, Office of the Deputy Governor (APO719).
 46.  Shimoji Genki, “Sengo Okinawa no Kyoikushi Gaikan,” Okinawa Kirisutokyo 
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on education policy; however, education is consistently placed last in the reports 
of the U.S. government on Okinawa.  For example, in the document Historical 
Report (Ryukyu U.S. Military Government Section) from January 1 to December 
31, 1949, there are seventeen total objectives presented.  The top three appear as 
(1) General, (2) Basic Directive, and (3) Military Government Administration, 
with “Education and Information” being listed last (17).47  This lack of 
prioritization for education goes against existing beliefs that educational oversight 
was a top priority for U.S. forces.
　 Building from this idea, A Monograph on the Okinawan Educational System 
underscores the inequality in the wage situation, during which highly-educated 
teachers received lower pay than people serving as dishwashers on the base.  The 
monthly salary range for teachers in July 1947 was as follows:48  
High School principals: 550 yen 
Technical High School principals: 420 yen 
Primary School principals: 363 yen 
High School teachers: 316 yen   
Grade School teachers: 263 yen.
　 The wages for jobs on the base were about the same or more than the wages of 
elementary school principals.  The pay for ordinary teachers was two to three 
times less than that of workers on the base.  Many teachers therefore left teaching 
to take jobs on the base.  In contrast to the pay scale for teachers, an average 
salary of 450 to 500 yen per month was paid to the workers on U.S. military 
bases, for example, bakers, fishermen and cashiers; telephone operators, file 
clerks, and gardeners received monthly salaries ranging from 325 to 375 yen; and 
the lowly kitchen helper received a monthly rate of 291 yen.  Considering the fact 
that six years of study beyond the elementary level was required for teachers, and 
little or no formal education was needed for the majority of the occupations listed 
here, the inequality in pay was even more pronounced.  The response of the U.S. 
military to the head of the Bunkyōbu, Yamashiro Atuo, when he appealed for a 
pay review, was terse: “You should read the document of February 7, 1947, which 
directed you to obey our directions unconditionally.”49  
　 Furthermore, after the establishment of the University of the Ryukyus, though 
the U.S. government intervened in administration, there was no budget from the 
U.S. government in the fiscal year 1965.  Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., who worked at the 
Tankidaigaku Kiyo 30 (2001): 199―210.
 47.  HMD 833537, 554―00141―00004―001.
 48.  RG338, Entry 34179, Box 1, A Monograph on the Okinawan Educational System, 
526th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment Ryukyus Command APO33, 15 May, 1948, 2.
 49. Uruma Shinpo, February 28, 1947.
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Center of Military History beginning in 1979, writes that military affairs came 
before civil affairs for the military government in the Ryukyu Islands.50   It is clear 
in its policy toward the Ryukyus that the U.S. valued it only as a military base, so 
it seems natural for the U.S. to have prioritized military affairs in the Ryukyus 
over civil affairs.
　 In Okinawa, Gunto Jorei (a regulation issued by Okinawa Gunto) Dai 16 go, 
Okinawa Gunto Kyoiku Kihon-ho (Education law issued by Okinawa Gunto) was 
issued on March 31, 1951.  The second chapter of the document allows for 
Kantoku-cho, the Okinawan authorities supervising education under the U.S. 
military government, to have preference in deciding the subjects of study in 
elementary schools.  Article 18, Provision 4, explains that elementary education 
should “cultivate the ability of the Japanese language and easy English necessary 
for daily life so that pupils can understand and use them appropriately.” This 
shows that it was the government of the Okinawan people that regulated 
elementary school education.51  
　 The San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded in September 1951 and it was 
made effective on April 28, 1952.  The execution rule in chapter 2, section 2, of 
the School Education Ordinance issued on April 1, 1951, regulates the subjects as 
follows.52
Article 22: In elementary school, standard subjects are Japanese, English, Social 
Studies, Math, Science, Music, Arts and Crafts, Home Economics, Business, P.E., 
and Special Education Activities.53  
At this point, English was listed as the second educational priority, following 
Japanese.  The Ryukyu Education Law was written before the Ryukyu government 
was established on April 1, 1952.  The head of the Bunkyōbu held public hearings 
many times for the councilors of each island, representatives of municipalities and 
communities, and principals.  The majority of them insisted that the content of the 
law should be the same as that of Japan.  The drafter of the law, whose name was 
mentioned only as McCormick, said that it followed the rules of Japan, but some 
parts were changed according to the situation of Okinawa.
　 According to the enforcement rules of Ryukyu Kyoiku Ho (Ryukyu Education 
Law, Ryukyu Islands USCAR Declaration 66), issued on March 2, 1953, the 
subjects are regulated as follows in chapter 2, “Elementary School,” section 3.
 50.  Fisch, Military Government.
 51.  Okinawa Gunto Jorei OPA (0000068230, 1951).
 52. Ryukyu Shiryo, No.3, Kyoiku-hen, Fukkokuban, 1978. 
 53.  Ibid., 525.
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Article 23: The standard subjects of elementary school are Japanese, Social Studies, 
Math, Science, Music, Arts and Crafts, Home Economics, P.E., English, and 
Independent Research.54  
At this point, English was still listed as one of the subjects; however, its order was 
shifted to second from last, which is quite different from the previous rule in 1952. 
In this Ryukyu Education Law (USCAR proclamation No.66), English still existed 
as a subject.  This law was drafted by the head of the education division of the 
U.S. civil government, who asked the opinions of the Okinawan people through 
Yara, the head of Bunkyōbu.  Bunkyōbu drafted their own Education Law, which 
they thought more democratic, but it was rejected by USCAR after it was 
approved by Rippoin.
　 In October 1953, the Ryukyu government Bunkyōbu began to draw up a 
standard curriculum and finalized the curriculum from elementary school to senior 
high school, following that of Japan almost exactly.  English disappeared from the 
standard curriculum of elementary school from 1954, which was drawn up by 
Bunkyō-kyoku (formerly Bunkyōbu).  In short, it can be said that English 
disappeared as a subject officially after the fiscal year 1954.  This was because 
Bunkyō-kyoku in Okinawa regulated the objectives and content of the Education 
Law following those of Japan.  As Warner states,
In the face of international acceptance of English as a second language and the 
knowledge that the majority of the scientific, technical, and professional journals of 
the world are printed in English, amendments to regulations for the enforcement of 
the School Education Law were passed on April 6, 1955, and the GRI Education 
Department decided to eliminate the study of English from the regular course of the 
primary schools.55  
It is clear that Warner wanted to continue English education in elementary school. 
However, as Okinawan teachers were at the heart of the movement of reversion to 
Japan, there was no enthusiasm to continue English education in elementary 
schools in Okinawa.  The introduction and disappearance of English education in 
the curriculum tells the story of a brief yet important chapter in Okinawan 
educational history.
　 The first official curriculum after the war was presented in February 1946 by 
Bunkyō Jiho 1 (educational guidance issued by Bunkyō).  At that time, English 
was a compulsory subject from the first grade of elementary school, and this 
 54.  Ibid., 550.
 55. Gordon Warner, History of Education, 125.  Also Bunkyō Jiho 1, February 1946.
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continued until it was abolished in the basic (kijyun) curriculum in 1954.56  Table 1 
summarizes the curriculum of elementary school English-language education from 
April 1946 to October 1953, according to Bunkyō Jiho issued by Bunkyōbu.  In 
the fiscal year 1946, English class was taught from 1st to 4th grades for one hour 
a week, for 5th and 6th grades two hours a week, and for 7th and 8th grades three 
hours a week.  There had been several changes, and finally in October 1953, 
English was dropped from the curriculum; however, it was the following fiscal 
year of 1954 that English disappeared officially.
　 The following are the changes in class time for English in elementary schools 
in Okinawa (mainland), which have been summarized according to the Bunkyō 
report:
 
Table 1. Number of Hours of English per Week for Elementary School Students, 1946 to 1953.
Grade 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
April 1946 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3
Sep.1946 2 2 2 2 2 2
April 1949 2–3 2–3 3–4 3–4 3–4 3–4
April 1951 1 1 2 2 3 3
April 1953 20 m 20 m 30 m 30 m 3 3
Oct.1953 0 0 0 0 0 0
On Miyako Island: 
 April 1949: 1 hour of lessons for 5th and 6th grades only
 April 1953: 1st–2nd grades, 10 minutes, 2 times a week
  3rd–4th grades, 10 minutes, 3 times a week (temporary)
  5th–6th grades, the same as last year
 October 1953: No mention of English class
　 In April 1952, Yongunto Seifu (the system in which the local government is set 
up in each gunto of four, Amami, Okinawa, Miyako, and Yaeyama) was dissolved 
and the Ryukyu government began.  In October 1953, Bunkyō-kyoku began 
making a basic curriculum with educational objectives.  These educational 
objectives were set up by mostly introducing the objectives of mainland Japan. 
That is why there was no English in the curriculum in the Bunkyō report of 
October 1953.  Below is the “Course of Study” for elementary schools that was 
shown the next month, November 1953.  The curriculum from November 1953 
and the curriculum from 1954 share the same content, and there is no English in 
either.  Table 2 shows the curriculum circulated in October 1953 for 1954.
 56. Okinawa no Sengo Kyoikushi, 452.
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 Table 2.  Elementary School Course of Study, 1953 and 1954.
Grade 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
Japanese language 25% (6) 24% (6) 25% (7) 24% (7) 22% (6.6) 22% (6.6)
Mathematics 15% (3.5) 16% (4) 15% (4) 14% (4) 13% (4) 13% (4)
Social Studies 11% (2.5) 12% (3) 13% (3.5) 14% (4) 13% (4) 13% (4)
Science 10% (2.5) 10% (2.5) 12% (3.5) 12% (3.5) 12% (3.5) 12% (3.5)
Music  8% (2)  8% (2)  6% (1.5)  7% (2)  6% (2)  6% (2)
Arts & Crafts  8% (2)  8% (2)  9% (2.5)  9% (2.5)  7% (2)  7% (2)
Home Economics  7% (2)  7% (2)
P.E. 13% (3) 12% (3) 10% (3) 10% (3) 10% (3) 10% (3)
Special Education Activity 10% (2.5) 10% (2.5) 10% (3) 10% (3) 10% (3) 10% (3)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Hours per week (24) (25) (28) (29) (30) (30)
Total hours in a year (840) (875) (980) (1,010) (1,050) (1,050)
Source: Ryukyu Shiryo 3.  Ryukyu-seifu Bunkyō-kyoku, 1958.
What can be found in this curriculum is that English disappeared and, at the same 
time, the focus was put on Japanese.  Japanese is studied nearly twice as often as 
some subjects, and more than twice as often as other subjects.  This was a 
reflection of the ideas of Yara, the head of Bunkyōbuchō, as well as Okinawan 
educators, that Okinawa asked for its identity from Japan and wished to return to 
Japan in the future.  Having children receive instruction in Japanese was a primary 
concern in order to fulfil the wishes of Okinawan educators.  Compulsory English-
language education in elementary schools in Okinawa ended in the fiscal year 
1954.
　 The Kijun Kyoiku Katei (Standard Course of Study) that was announced in 
November 1953 was the result of the work of interdisciplinary committee 
members and over seventy individual planning sessions.  Its characteristics and 
procedures to be completed are described as follows: 
1.  It was born from the request of teachers working in schools. 
2.  It showed the criteria to be relied on as the region of Okinawa. 
3.  It should only be used as a reference, and standardization should be avoided.57  
The Standard Course of Study clearly says that it was completed by Okinawan 
teachers with a vested interest in improving the educational situation of the 
 57.  Ryukyu Shiryo, 543.
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islands.
　 Therefore, Okinawan educators were able to decide and compile the school 
curriculum.  From the start of Bunkyōbu in 1946, the members of the organization 
were Okinawan educators who worked under the control of an officer of the U.S. 
military government.  English-language education was one of the important 
occupation policies for the U.S. military government at the time.  If at all possible, 
they intended to provide education in English; however, Okinawan educators, 
including the Bunkyōbu, were against it.  In November 1950, Okinawa Gunto 
Seifu was established and for the first time, a governor in each region (Okinawa, 
Miyako, Yaeyama, and Amami) was directly elected.
　 On December 25, 1950, USCAR was established.  In place of Yamashiro Atuo, 
Yara Chobyo became the head (Bunkyōbuchō) of Bunkyōbu.  Since the textbooks 
were the same as those of mainland Japan, the Henshū-ka, the section for textbook 
editing, was abolished.  The Kenkyū-chōsa-ka (the research survey section), 
which dealt with the curriculum, was soon established.  In February 1951, Bunkyō 
Shingi Iinkai (the Committee on Education) was set up to deliberate educational 
matters, especially important laws on education.  The mission of Bunkyō Shingi 
Iinkai is explained as follows: 
At the turning point of education, not only we (educators) but also the general public 
feel the necessity of the organization for guidance on education.  For educational 
reform, we have to refer to Japanese educational laws and the Japanese system; 
however, at the same time we should be creative enough to do so from an original 
Okinawan viewpoint.58  
The members’ first goal was to enact the Fundamental Law of Education and 
School Education Regulations.  In the discussion, committee member Maeda 
Giken argued that while the Fundamental Law of Education should follow that of 
Japan, school education ordinances should be flexible according to the situation of 
Okinawa.  Regarding language education, he proposed that the current English-
language education was excessive and that the issue of Japanese-language 
education and English education should be discussed.
　 In the discussion of Gunto Gikai on April 1951, Yara explained the content of 
Okinawa Gunto Gakko Kyoiku Jorei (Okinawa Gunto School Education 
Regulations).  In the beginning, he explained that Bunkyōbu followed the 
Japanese School Education Law to make the School Education Law of Okinawa, 
and the draft of the Okinawan School Education Law was discussed in Bunkyō 
Shingi Iinkai set up in Bunkyōbu.  Yara argued strongly for the continuing 
emphasis on Japanese as the “national language needed for daily life,” even within 
 58.  Okinawa no Sengo Kyoikushi, 45.
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a U.S.-occupied state.  His advocacy, both from a practical and cultural viewpoint, 
helped convince the governing bodies of the need to return to a Japanese-centered 
language education.  As can be understood from this discussion, Bunkyōbu and 
Bunkyō Shingi Iinkai wanted to follow the Japanese Education Law and use 
Japanese to educate Okinawan children.59  
　 The memorandum of the Deputy Governor for Deputy Civil Administrator 
(April 26, 1952) says that all economic, educational, and cultural administrative 
agencies should be made to conform with the Japanese pattern.  It is also clear that 
education in Okinawa was conducted by Bunkyōbu and the laws regulated on 
education in Okinawa were set up by Bunkyōbu, which was organized by 
Okinawan educators in the end.  Therefore, it can be said that compulsory English 
education in elementary schools was ended by Okinawan educators.  Around the 
time that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was conducted, the USCAR’s concern 
was not necessarily on education in Okinawa but on other concerns, such as 
Okinawa’s governance and the land seizures that accompanied the construction of 
U.S. military bases.  USCAR allowed Okinawan educators to follow the Japanese 
Education Law and return to a Japanese-centered linguistic and cultural education. 
English was removed as a required course of study and placed in the elective 
courses of the senior high school curriculum, leaving it to the discretion of the 
local school board as to whether English instruction could and should be offered 
in elementary and junior high schools.60  
Conclusion
　 Compulsory elementary school English-language education was inseparable 
from U.S. occupation strategy and policy in the late 1940s.  The harbingers of its 
ending were the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the clarification of Okinawa’s 
political position according to the treaty.  Two political concerns operated in the 
background of the ending of compulsory English-language education in 
elementary schools: first, the approval of Japan’s potential sovereignty over the 
Ryukyus; and second, the stationing of the U.S. military in Japan and the Ryukyus 
for security.  The terms of the U.S. occupation over the Ryukyus were not 
clarified; however, Okinawan educators who wished for reunification with Japan 
made efforts to have their pupils learn Japanese.  They also requested that both the 
Japanese government and the U.S. military government make Okinawa’s 
educational policies and administrative development follow those of Japan.  In 
contrast, the desire of the U.S. military to maintain their occupation in Okinawa 
 59.  Minutes of the 7th Okinawa Gunto Gikai, April 28, 1951, OPA.
 60.  “Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyus Islands,” vol. 1, no. 2, Ryukyu University 
Library, Sengo Shiryo 30 (June 1953): 56.
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posed problems for Okinawan educators wishing to follow the Japanese education 
system.  It was only after the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty that 
Okinawa’s following of Japanese education was approved by the U.S. 
government.  Even though there were great efforts by Okinawan people and 
educators who wished to reunite with Japan to restore education, without the 
approval of Japan’s potential sovereignty, following Japan’s educational system 
would have been impossible.  Therefore, it can be said that compulsory English-
language education in elementary schools ended in 1954 due to the approval of 
Japan’s potential sovereignty over the Ryukyus as well as the clarification of its 
political position, both of which were determined in the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty. 
